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Abstract. In 2007, Germany changed network access regulation in the natural gas
sector and introduced a so-called entry–exit system. The spot market effects of the rere-
gulation remain to be examined. We use cointegration analysis and a state space
model with time-varying coefficients to study the development of natural gas spot
prices in the two major trading hubs in Germany and the interlinked spot market in
the Netherlands. To analyse information efficiency in more detail, the state space
model is extended to an error correction model. Overall, our results suggest a reason-
able degree of price convergence between the corresponding hubs. Market efficiency in
terms of information processing has increased considerably among Germany and the
Netherlands.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The introduction of the European Gas Directive (98/30/EC) and the EU ‘Accelera-
tion Directive’ (2003/55/EC) brought fundamental changes in the natural gas sec-
tor across many European countries. The natural gas industries were transformed
from vertically integrated monopolies to more competitive structures coupled
with price deregulation and privatisation. While some countries, notably the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands, have been relatively progressive in the
liberalisation process, others such as Germany have moved more cautiously.
Germany did not effectively open its natural gas market until the EU Directive
2003/55/EC was transposed into national law in 2005.
The implementation of the European directive into national law led to a new
institutional design called the entry–exit system. The primary aims of introduc-
ing the entry–exit system were to facilitate market entry in the energy sector and
establish competition in wholesale and retail energy markets, as per the EU
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policy of creating a common integrated market for natural gas in Europe. As a
consequence, regional natural gas wholesale markets in the form of different vir-
tual trading points (hubs) were established in Germany. Two major German hubs
emerged, with NetConnect Germany (NCG) roughly covering the South and GA-
SPOOL (GPL) covering the North, essentially creating a liquid market for natural
gas in Germany. Whether these two subnational markets are well-functioning
remains to be empirically tested.
To evaluate whether the German natural gas wholesale market is functioning
yet, we study the price convergence and the development of market efficiency in
Germany. Price convergence shows how strongly the prices are related across
similar markets, whereas information efficiency depicts the ability of the market
to respond to available information and incorporate it into the prices. Therefore,
prices should reveal and aggregate all available information in an efficient mar-
ket. However, analysing the prices across only the two major German hubs may
be misleading as it could neglect the possible importance of the directly con-
nected, large Dutch gas market. The Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF) hub could
be considered to be one of the most liquid wholesale gas trading hubs in conti-
nental Europe. The large number of transactions and participants at the TTF cre-
ate a sound competitive environment. A high level of trading activity by
domestic and foreign traders also illustrates the importance of the TTF for the
European gas market. However, the balancing regimes between TTF and German
markets vary as TTF, at least on a physical level, is an hourly market. Nonethe-
less, TTF can serve as a (competitive) benchmark for the German natural gas spot
markets considering its liquidity and proximity to Germany.
Furthermore, well functioning, connected markets, in theory, should show
equal prices for a certain good (law of one price). Such markets share a common
long-run equilibrium price and can be said to be economically integrated. Persis-
tent price differences beyond transaction costs should not exist. This is to say
that the price differential does not have to vanish for the market to be efficient.
In reality, the price of energy is different most of the time, implying that the
long-run equilibrium price levels and the resulting variation could be crucial,
though not an explicit part of our analysis. Likewise, the market’s response to
external shocks and corresponding reversion to the competitive equilibrium
should be fast, i.e. information should be processed efficiently.
To analyse whether the prices at the different hubs have common long-run
equilibrium, we use cointegration analysis (Johansen, 1988, 1991). One implicit
assumption of cointegration analysis is that the structural relation among the
prices is fixed over the time period considered; however, due to the ongoing
changes in the regulatory framework in Europe and Germany and the different
mergers of Germany’s gas transmission system operators (TSOs), market integra-
tion could also be a gradual and ongoing process. In a second step, we therefore
examine the convergence path of the natural gas spot market prices and the
degree of market integration by estimating a state space model using a Kalman
filter. In contrast to cointegration analysis, this estimator allows time-varying
coefficients and thus explicitly accounts for possible dynamic structural changes.
Finally, the state space model is extended to an error correction model to analyse
how efficiently markets respond to new information. The time-varying nature of
this approach allows us to draw conclusions as to how market efficiency evolved
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over time and whether changes in the regulatory framework have led to better
market functioning. We find a reasonable degree of price convergence between
the corresponding hubs. Also, information efficiency has increased considerably
among Germany and the Netherlands.
Natural gas market integration and price convergence as an aftermath of mar-
ket liberalisation have been the focus of a variety of international studies. How-
ever, the methodology used to account for market integration and price
convergence differs across studies. Using cointegration analysis, Walls (1994) and
De Vany and Walls (1993, 1996) find that the opening of network access in the
aftermath of FERC Order 436 in 1985 led to greater market integration, as prices
across different locations converged in the North American natural gas markets.
Serletis and Rangel-Ruiz (2004) show that the main driver for North American
natural gas prices is the price trend at the Henry Hub. Applying a vector error
correction (VEC) model, Cuddington and Wang (2006) find different degrees of
market integration across regions. While the East and Central regions are highly
integrated, the Western market is only loosely connected to common price
trends.
In the European context, Asche et al. (2002) apply cointegration techniques to
test for the law of one price across the French, German and Belgian markets
using monthly natural gas import prices. Their results show an integrated gas
market where prices across the regions considered follow a similar pattern over
time. Using a Kalman filter, Neumann et al. (2006) study the price relation
between the United Kingdom (National Balancing Point) and the Belgian spot
market (Zeebrugge). They conclude that prices between these two markets have
fully converged. Other empirical studies like Ripple (2001), Siliverstovs et al.
(2005) and Neumann (2009) have investigated price relations for natural gas
between different continents. All studies find evidence for an increased price
convergence across continents.
Our article differs from the existing literature on natural gas price conver-
gence and market integration in three ways. First, we focus our analysis on the
market effect of a new network access regime on a subnational gas market
level by looking at the dynamic price interactions between two major German
gas spot markets. Moreover, these regional market developments are put into a
European context by relating them to the Dutch spot market. Second, we
apply both cointegration analysis and a time-varying coefficient approach.
Extending the time-varying coefficient approach to an error correction model
enables us to draw conclusions not only about price convergence but also
about how efficiently new information is absorbed by the market and how this
information efficiency has evolved over time. Third, we explicitly control for
transportation costs, which have been neglected to a certain extent in previous
literature.
This article is structured as follows. Section two describes the institutional
design of the German natural gas market. The econometric methodology is laid
out in section three. Data description follows in section four. Section five
includes the estimation results and interpretation. Finally, section six concludes
with potential policy recommendations.
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2. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
GERMANY
In 2005, a new Energy Law (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz, EnWG) was enacted in
Germany to transpose the European Directive 2003/55/EC into national law. Its
major purpose is to develop and establish competition in the German energy sec-
tor. A system charging regime based on simple entry and exit charges (entry–exit
system) was imposed concerning third-party access to the natural gas networks.
The transmission network operators and the regulator concluded an agreement
regarding the institutional design of the new regime in October 2006. Since 1
October 2007, the entry–exit system has become mandatory for all TSOs. The
agreement initially divided Germany into 19 entry–exit zones (also called market
areas or transmission system zones). Meanwhile, the number of zones have
decreased to three, one for L-gas and two for H-gas (as of April 2011) due to sev-
eral poolings mandated by additional governmental intervention in the form of
an amendment of the German Energy Law (§20 Sec. 1b EnWG). H-gas is a high
caloric natural gas primarily delivered from Norway and Russia to Germany.
L-gas is a low caloric natural gas and has a lesser energy content than H-gas. Our
focus is solely on H-gas, as low calorific gas plays only a minor role in the Ger-
man economy. The market zones for H-gas were developed as follows: NCG initi-
ated a major pooling which became operational on October 1st, 2008 and
combined the former areas of E.ON and Bayernets. In October 2009, GRTgaz
Deutschland, ENI and GVS joined NCG. In April 2011, Thyssengas, the former
RWE gas TSO, joined NCG as the latest member. While NCG covers the South
and West of Germany, GASPOOL (GPL), is located in the North of Germany and
is the second major market zone.1 The core of this area had already been estab-
lished in 2006 as a result of a cooperative arrangement between BEB, StatoilHy-
dro and DONG Energy. In July 2008, Gasunie, operating the Dutch transmission
network, took over the transportation services of BEB. In October 2009, ONTRAS
and Wingas Transport joined GPL.
The entry–exit system requires that the natural gas shippers book capacity at
the relevant entry and exit points separately; hence, the charges to be paid for
the transportation of natural gas (the so-called entry and exit charges) are no
longer based on the distance between the entry and exit points (also known as
the contractual path) as previously practised in Germany. The abolition of such
a ‘path-based’ charging system was meant to promote price transparency, as
shippers no longer needed to obtain individual quotations for each separate cus-
tomer, thereby reducing pricing complexity. Moreover, the trading possibilities
at multiple hubs, as a result of an entry–exit system, should deliver a competitive
price signal to the German natural gas market as a whole. The entry–exit system
should facilitate both domestic as well as cross-border transports for third parties,
thus encouraging market entry and eventually competition. Furthermore, the
market redesign aimed at increasing the flexibility and comfort in booking proce-
dures as no capacity reservation is required for the individual pipeline sections
used to fulfil transport contracts. In sum, consumers and distributors were
1. GASPOOL has been renamed several times over the considered period. We use the current name
GASPOOL for this market zone throughout this article to avoid any confusion.
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intended to benefit from increasing gas-to-gas competition as a result of the
implementation of the entry–exit system after gas market liberalisation.
However, the potential economic success of the reform is not clear. The Ger-
man Antitrust Commission complained about the illiquidity of the natural gas
wholesale market, congestion and grandfathered capacity rights held by the
incumbents (Monopolkommission, 2009). Whether such market barriers could
effectively rule out the aim of achieving competition and liquidity in the natural
gas sector, even with the introduction of the entry–exit regime, remains an
empirical question.
3. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY
In this section, we (1) deduce empirical criteria for measuring German natural
gas market competitiveness and its development, and (2) present the correspond-
ing econometric methodology. To test the law of one price, we adjust the regio-
nal natural gas spot prices at GASPOOL (GPL), NCG and the Dutch TTF hub
accounting for transmission charges. We employ cointegration analysis to test
whether prices tend to move towards a common long-run equilibrium price. We
use these results as a first indication as to whether markets are integrated or not.
In a final step, we estimate a time-varying coefficient model using the Kalman
filter to study price convergence over time. Here, we develop a time-varying error
correction model to identify the development of information efficiency.
3.1. The law of one price and transmission charges
The starting point for our analysis is the spatial arbitrage condition for efficient
markets, which says that prices of identical products traded at regionally distinct
locations should differ only in transaction costs (law of one price). In natural gas
markets, the most noteworthy transaction costs are the network charges that
shippers have to pay for gas transmission. Thus, freedom from arbitrage for gas
traded at different locations is assured as long as the price in the exporting
region (Pj,t) plus the cost of transmission (TCj?i,t) equals the price in the import-
ing region (Pi,t). The spatial arbitrage condition can be generalised as follows:
Pi;t ! Pj;t "TCj!i;t ; ð1Þ
where the equality holds only if trade between the two regions occurs for any
day t. If the price differential is strictly less than the cost associated with gas
transport, market participants have no incentive to trade. Moreover, efficient
markets should not involve any significant price differences that go beyond the
transaction costs necessary to realise spatial arbitrage. To detect these price differ-
ences, we adjust the gas price series for transportation costs if the price difference
between two regions exceeds the corresponding transmission charges. Thus, we
assume rational arbitrage behaviour of shippers. In an entry–exit regime, these
costs in one direction consist of the exit charge for the exporting region and the
entry charge for the importing region. With regard to continental Europe, trans-
mission charges are direction-specific, i.e. TCi?j,t 6¼ TCj?i,t. Due to this asymmet-
ric characteristic, the adjusted spot price (ex transmission charges) Pneti;t can be
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calculated as suggested by Zachmann (2008) who analysed convergence of Euro-
pean electricity spot prices controlling for the outcome of capacity auctions:
Pneti;t ¼ Pi;t ! dj!i;t & TCj!i;t ;
dj!i;t ¼ 1 if Pj;t þ TCj!i;t\Pi;t and dj!i;t ¼ 0 otherwise;
i; j ¼ GPL;NCG;TTF:
ð2Þ
We include a set of binary variables d, mapping potential flows between the
regions i and j. A binary variable dj?i,t is equal to 1 if the price Pj,t in the low
price region plus the costs of shipping the natural gas to the high price region
TCj?i,t are less than the price Pi,t, and zero otherwise. Thus, spot prices are
adjusted only if the price differential between two regions exceeds transportation
costs, i.e. arbitrage is profitable.
The price adjustment enables us to detect sustainable price differences other
than transportation charges. It should be noted that binary variables for two
regions can both be zero at the same time, but they can never be unity at the
same time. The former situation prevails if spot price differentials are too low to
exceed the transmission charges, in which case trading gas between the two
regions would be unprofitable.
Using log prices ðpneti;t ¼ logðPneti;t ÞÞ; we will analyse if the markets are economi-
cally integrated, i.e. if prices at distinct locations show similar price patterns. If
prices move apart and price differences other than transportation charges prevail,
markets are not economically integrated and not efficient. However, real world
complexities in trading imply that several factors may exist leading to deviations
from these conditions. For example, the price differential, among others, can
contain different factors like balances of demand, day-ahead booking based on
scheduled and forced outages, interruption risk variations, maintenance, exoge-
nous gas flows, oil expected variance, winter versus front season demand and
market liquidity, which are not possible to explicitly account for in our model.
Our model implicitly assumes that any variation resulting from non-captured
risks are equal to zero within the period of examination over the long run. None-
theless, the hypothesis to be tested is that the establishment of an entry–exit sys-
tem has removed some of the causes of inefficiency, and that prices converged as
a result thereafter.
3.2. Cointegration tests
A precondition for cointegration analysis is that the individual time series are
integrated of order 1, I(1). Therefore, we test for unit roots using the Augmented
Dickey Fuller (ADF, Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and the Kwiatkowski Phillips
Schmidt and Shin (KPSS, Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) stationarity tests. Both tests
allow us to detect unit roots in individual time series, though the assumption on
the test statistic obtained under the null hypothesis varies. ADF obtains the test
statistic under the null of the series being non-stationary, whereas KPSS assumes
the null hypothesis of stationary to run the test. ADF tests also tend to have low
explaining power, especially in small sample dataset when compared with KPSS.
Hence, double testing can mitigate the risk of a false conclusion when unit root
tests face the problem of poor power properties.
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Applying the Johansen cointegration test (Johansen, 1988, 1991), cointegra-
tion to natural gas spot price series of two regions, one expects exactly one coin-
tegrating relationship if these regions have a long-run equilibrium. The
corresponding two dimensional VEC model with the cointegration rank r (less
than and equal to k) is given in the following equation:
Dpnett ¼ Ppnett!1 þ
Xl!1
k¼1
CkDpnett!k þ et ; ð3Þ
where D is the first difference operator, pnett is the vector of the two log spot
prices, ɛt ( n.i.i.d.(0, Σ), Π is a matrix of the form Π = ab′, with b comprising
the cointegrating vector and a representing the corresponding loadings. a and b
are k * r matrices and Γk is a k * k matrix. While b coefficients show the long-run
equilibrium relationship between price levels, a coefficients measure the adjust-
ment speed towards equilibrium. The closer b is to (minus) one, the better eco-
nomically integrated the markets are. A high absolute value for a, in turn,
indicates a high speed of price adjustment and a more efficient market. Further-
more, the value of a can also increase due to the introduction of a new pipeline
which engenders a competitive effect and due to over-capacity in both markets.
According to equation (1), we expect b = {1, !1}. In order to control for price
differences other than transmission charges, we allow for a constant in the coin-
tegration relationship; however, for efficient markets, this constant should be
(close to) zero.
The Johansen approach assumes a constant cointegrating vector over time. As
pointed out by King and Cuc (1996), the cointegration relationship does not
shed any light on the dynamics of possible price convergence or divergence.
Given the background of the dynamic regulatory framework in Europe, as
pointed out earlier, the assumption of a fixed relationship between spot prices
over time may be problematic. Following the line of argument of Barrett and Li
(2002), we use results from cointegration only as a kind of pretest as to deter-
mine whether markets are integrated or not.
3.3. Time-varying coefficient model
An approach with time-varying coefficients can overcome the drawbacks of coin-
tegration analysis and can account for the dynamics of parallel price develop-
ments from regionally distinct markets. The introduction of a time-varying
coefficient into the linear relationship of prices enables us to analyse the path of
price convergence or divergence over time.
By recalling equation (1) and introducing a constant cij, we can formulate the
following state space model:
pneti;t ¼ cij þ btpnetj;t þ et ;
bt ¼ bt!1 þ mt
ð4Þ
where et (n:i:i:d:ð0; r2e Þ and mt (n:i:i:d:ð0; r2m Þ are white noise processes and bt is
the scalar of unobservable coefficients at time t which resembles a random walk
process without drift. This implies that bt is neither variance nor covariance
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stationary, but rather mean stationary. The constant cij is expressed in log levels,
whereas the original transmission charge is expressed in price levels.
The coefficient bt represents the strength of price convergence across regions.
If bt = 0, it implies that there is no relation between the natural gas spot prices
and that markets are completely decoupled. If prices have converged and mar-
kets are perfectly integrated and competitive, bt should be equal to 1.
The state space model is estimated using the Kalman filter (Harvey, 1987;
Kalman, 1960). This technique processes the data in two consecutive steps. It
first estimates bt by using available information for the period t ! 1. In a second
step, the estimates of bt are updated by incorporating prediction errors from the
first step (to time t ! 1) to compute values for time t. Applying the Kalman filter
provides information for cij and for bt at each point in time, and thus enables us
to obtain detailed information on the common development of prices.
In employing the Kalman filter, it is important to determine the initial vari-
ances for ɛt and mt, as well as of the expected value of b0. This is because the max-
imum likelihood function usually has several local maxima. Therefore,
inadequately chosen starting points can lead to undesirable results. Exaggerated
values of r2m would lead to the inclusion of short-term behaviour, making it diffi-
cult to distinguish random shocks from structural relationships. In contrast, set-
ting the variance too low would ignore significant developments in the
convergence process over time.
Calibrating
Eðb0Þ ¼ 1 )
pneti;1
pnetj;1
; r2e ¼ 0:1 ) Varðpneti;t Þ and r2m ¼ r2e =1;000
provides suitable noise reduction and signal preservation.
Finally, we use the framework of time-varying coefficients to formulate an
error correction model in the following way:
Dpneti;t ¼ cij þ atðpneti;t!1 ! pnetj;t!1Þ þ et
at ¼ at!1 þ mt
ð5Þ
where at measures the time it takes to bring the system back towards equilib-
rium after new information appears on the market. The larger the absolute
value for at is, the higher the speed of price adjustment is and the more effi-
ciently information can be converted into price signals. Therefore, the time-
varying framework enables us to draw conclusions not only on how efficiently
prices are adjusted to new information but also how efficiency evolved over
time. Since the entry–exit regime was introduced to ease gas transmission and
foster gas-to-gas competition, we expect the absolute value of at to increase over
time.
The error correction model specification needs a new calibration of the start-
ing values for the Kalman filter:
Eða0Þ ¼ 0 )
Dpneti;2
pneti;1 ! pnetj;1
; r2e ¼ 0:1 ) VarðDpneti;t Þ and r2m ¼ r2e
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Setting the expected value of a0 to zero assumes inefficient information pro-
cessing at the beginning of the observation period. This seems especially plausi-
ble, since market participants generally need time to adapt to a new regulatory
regime (Growitsch and Weber, 2008).
4. DATA
The aim of this article was to test for market integration and price convergence
between the major two entry–exit zones in Germany, namely GPL and NCG. In
addition, we analyse price relations with respect to the Dutch trading hub TTF,
which is well connected with Germany and a major European gas trading point.
It should be noted that the TTF hub is connected to LNG terminals, implying
that the LNG flow may influence the price surrounding the Netherlands,
whereas the gas flow from Russia has a greater influence on price in NCG areas.
For the German trading hubs, we have used the day-ahead spot market settle-
ment price for natural gas, publicly obtained from the European Energy
Exchange (EEX), whereas data for TTF has been obtained from Energate.
Although only 10% of the total volume is traded at EEX (90% is traded over-the-
counter, OTC), we have chosen EEX data as it is the only publicly available price
series covering a longer time period without structural breaks. The use of high
frequency data should better capture the markets’ reactions to ongoing regula-
tory and market reforms, thereby facilitating the investigation of market integra-
tion. The observation period is from 1 October 2007, when the mandatory
introduction of the entry–exit system came into operation, to March 2011. Price
data for both German market areas prior to October 2007 hardly exist and face
the problem of low reliability. The time period considered covers three and a
half so-called ‘gas years’, each starting with the heating season in October. Thus,
we have 915 observations (trading days) for every price series. The prices have
been transformed into logarithmic form. Log-transformed prices better capture
the underlying distribution of the residuals used in our model as assumed under
the financial pricing theory. As spot prices are log-normally distributed, the log
returns in the ordinary least squares of cointegration are also assumed to be nor-
mally distributed.
It can be seen from Figure 1 that the day-ahead prices for natural gas were vol-
atile throughout the time period considered for all market areas. The prices
became more volatile during the last quarter of 2007, whereas the volatility
declined from the first quarter of 2008 to the third quarter of 2008. Starting in
the first quarter of 2009, prices witnessed a steep decline. The change is likely –
at least to some extent – to be explained by the falling prices for crude oil. Gas
prices in mainland Europe are often index-linked to those of crude oil, with an
expected time lag of between a quarter and a season. While the price for Brent
Crude Oil peaked on 3 July 2008, GPL prices reached their maximum on 23 Sep-
tember, 2008. NCG and TTF prices both peaked on 17 September 2008. This also
indicates that the development of oil price can be crucial to our model. From
the third quarter of 2009 onwards, gas prices started to rise again due to the
ongoing recovery of the economy after the crisis in 2008–09. All in all, the price
Price Convergence and Information Efficiency
© 2013 The Authors.
German Economic Review © 2013 Verein f€ur Socialpolitik 9
series show a rather similar development pattern over time,2 leading to the
expectation of highly integrated markets and thus values close to one for the b
coefficient in equations (3) and (4).
Information on transmission charges was obtained from the websites of the
relevant TSOs as well as in interviews with the shippers. However, consistent his-
torical data on transmission charges is not publicly available, which can be prob-
lematic. This is because the quality of the analysis of the spot gas markets
depends on the quality of the data on transmission charges. For each possible
relation between the three considered markets, we chose a representative con-
necting point. To get consistent data, we converted the corresponding capacity-
based entry and exit charges expressed in [€/(kWh/h)/a] into [€/MWh]. We
assumed that a transport of one MWh of natural gas corresponds to a capacity of
one MW. However, the capacity charge could contain a time value for the pro-
vided flexibility (real option). Consequently, the capacity utilisation does not
have to be aligned with the activities on spot gas markets, which may lead to
partial mismatches of maturities. The charges are frequently changed by TSOs.
The resulting development of transmission charges over time is summarised in
Table 1. While the cost of transporting natural gas within Germany has
decreased quite substantially (by about 25%), charges for cross-border transmis-
sion have decreased slightly.
All three regions show a significant number of trading days, at which price
differentials exceed transportation costs (Table 2). While within Germany
price differences are mostly below transportation charges, nearly 50% of the time
arbitrage would have been profitable regarding the two neighbouring regions
Figure 1 Logarithmic day-ahead spot prices (€/MWh)
2. This is confirmed by descriptive statistics, which are available from the authors upon request. For
example, the standard deviation, as a proxy for volatility, is around 0.40 €/MWh (in log terms)
for all three regions.
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GPL and TTF. Last but not least, price differences above shipping costs are
observed more often during the first half of the period of examination.
5. RESULTS
To answer the question as to whether the introduction of an entry–exit regime
has led to more competitive market conditions, we first present the results of the
cointegration analysis, and then the results of the time-varying coefficient
approaches.
5.1. Cointegration analysis
To check whether the price series fulfil the precondition for cointegration
analysis, we test for unit roots. The results from both ADF and KPSS provide a
clear picture. All-time series have a unit root and are I(1), as first differences are
stationary.
Next, we estimate equation (3), applying the approach developed by Johansen
(1988, 1991). Each pairwise price relation has exactly one cointegrating term
indicating that long-run equilibria do exist. Price series share a common stochas-
tic trend and hence will not drift apart greatly in the long run.
Table 1 Transmission charges
Direction of
transport
Connecting
point
Transmission charges [€/MWh]
10/07 10/08 12/08 04/09 07/09 10/09 01/10 10/10
GPL ? NCG Bunder Tief 0.619 0.582 0.565 0.534 0.534 0.483 0.483 0.453
NCG ? GPL 0.557 0.523 0.512 0.497 0.497 0.434 0.434 0.417
GPL ? TTF Oude
Statenzijl
0.420 0.420 0.420 0.410 0.400 0.366 0.361 0.361
TTF ? GPL 0.409 0.409 0.409 0.394 0.408 0.338 0.334 0.334
NCG ? TTF Bocholtz 0.387 0.399 0.386 0.386 0.398 0.411 0.406 0.398
TTF ? NCG 0.486 0.498 0.484 0.484 0.490 0.429 0.422 0.397
GPL, GASPOOL; NCG, NetConnect Germany; TTF, Title Transfer Facility.
Table 2 Summary statistics on price differences
Region
GPL-NCG GPL-TTF NCG-TTF
Average [€/MWh] 0.25 0.42 0.17
Mean absolute [€/MWh] 0.52 0.56 0.56
No. of observations 915 915 915
Days with price differences above TC (total) 281 453 364
Days with price differences above TC (first half) 204 238 235
GPL, GASPOOL; NCG, NetConnect Germany; TTF, Title Transfer Facility; TC, cost of transmission.
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All b coefficients from the VEC model are very close to one. A likelihood ratio
test detects if the restriction of the cointegrating vector is b = {1, !1}, meaning
that a 1% price change in region i is accompanied by the same price change in
region j. Only in the case of GPL and the Dutch TTF does this indication of very
strong market integration have to be rejected at a 10% level. An insignificant con-
stant in the long-run cointegrating equation signals that no other significant price
differences exist in addition to the already captured transmission charges, and
therefore no persistent price differential occurs. Looking at the error correction
coefficient a, we see significant bidirectional price adjustments for GPL-NCG and
GPL-TTF. The relationship of natural gas spot prices between GPL and TTF is stron-
ger since the level of significance and adjustment speed are a bit higher. However,
for GPL-NCG only around 10% of an external shock is absorbed within one period
(i.e. one trading day), GPL prices adjust for 20% of an imbalance with TTF prices.
The corresponding half-lives, defined as the time in which a marginal change in
the stationary component becomes half of the initial jump and computed as ln
(0.5)/ln(1 ! a), are 6.4 and 3 days respectively. The stronger interrelation between
GPL and TTF may be due to the fact that both networks are now run by the same
TSO, Gasunie. The asymmetric price adjustment in the latter case, with GPL prices
adjusting faster than TTF prices, indicates that TTF, as the larger and more liquid
market, is the leading market for GPL. The same argument holds for the NCG-TTF
results, with only the NCG adjusting to deviations from equilibrium. A likelihood
ratio test restricting aTTF to zero confirms that TTF is weakly exogenous for NCG.
These results support the hypothesis that the Dutch TTF can be considered as a
kind of reference or leading market for both German market areas.
To summarise, results from cointegration analysis provide evidence of market
integration across the two German market areas considered in this study; how-
ever, one has to interpret these results with care. The presence of cointegration
does not necessarily imply the stability of the estimated b parameter. Moreover,
the long-run b coefficient may not stay constant over time, as several structural
changes occurred in the natural gas markets within the period considered.
5.2. Time-varying coefficient
The time-varying coefficient approach is particularly suitable for accounting for
these structural changes. Table 3 presents the main results of the analysis of mar-
ket integration via price convergence (equation 4), as well as the outcomes of
the error correction model (equation 5) that give insights into the development
of information efficiency.
NetConnect Germany and TTF show the highest degree of price convergence
(0.983) in the final state of the convergence process and a very high speed of
adjustment to changes in available market information. This means these highly
integrated markets seem to be almost efficient.
Figure 2 shows the development of the b coefficients over time. All three pairs
of market zones started with a rather high degree of price convergence (above
0.96)3 that increased moderately after the introduction of the entry–exit regime
3. The high value at the beginning is not sensitive to the assumption of E(b0) = 1. Setting E(b0) = 0
reveals similar results.
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in October 2007. The coefficients for GPL-NCG and GPL-TTF peaked around July
2008, which coincides with the takeover of BEB by Gasunie. A plunge in the b
coefficient for both price relations can be observed right after the establishment
of NCG as a merger of E.ON and Bayernets (October 2008). While prices between
NCG and GPL started to converge again, the gap between GPL and TTF prices
decreased only slightly. Concerning NCG and TTF, the price gap decreased more
or less steadily until the first quarter of 2009, but increased thereafter. By April
2011, the b coefficient of GPL-NCG swung back above the initial level of price
convergence, whereas the other two relations approximately reached their start-
ing values. All in all, the Dutch-German gas market appears to be well integrated.
However, one might argue that the formations of the b coefficients are mainly
Table 3 Results of the time-varying coefficient models
Region Price convergence Information efficiency
[Equation (4)] [Equation (5)]
b Constant a Constant
GPL-NCG 0.975*** 0.034*** 0.047 !0.0002
(0.001) (0.005) (0.267) (0.0007)
GPL-TTF 0.969*** 0.044*** !0.568* 0.001*
(0.002) (0.007) (0.266) (0.0006)
NCG-TTF 0.983*** 0.006*** !0.979*** 0.002***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.261) (0.0007)
Notes: For the coefficients the final state is provided. Numbers in brackets report the root mean square
error for the coefficients and standard errors for the constant. GPL, GASPOOL; NCG, NetConnect
Germany; TTF, Title Transfer Facility. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
Figure 2 Price convergence b
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explained by the oil price movement as a common exogenous factor driving the
gas prices. We believe that such argument seems to be implausible since the
decline of price convergence between NCG and TTF started later than in the
other two cases. Furthermore, the oil price has already increased since beginning
of 2009.
However, as pointed out above, market integration in terms of price conver-
gence has to be distinguished from market efficiency. Therefore, the question
remains as to whether the observed degree of price convergence is sufficient to
allow efficient adjustment to new information. The development of information
efficiency is depicted in Figure 3. The coefficient a of the error correction model
from equation (5) indicates how fast prices turn back to equilibrium once new
information has appeared. The higher the absolute value of a is, the faster
prices adjust to new information and the more efficient markets are. The price
relation between GPL and NCG shows the lowest efficiency over most of the
time period considered. In the first year after the entry–exit system became
mandatory, prices adjust pairwise between NCG and GPL to around 10% of
new information within one day, which is about half the speed of pairwise
price adjustment between GPL and TTF (Figure 3). The information processing
between NCG and TTF, being the highest for nearly the entire observation per-
iod, may be explained by considerably higher trading volumes at NCG com-
pared with GPL.4 The churn rate of NCG, measuring the ratio between traded
and physically delivered volumes, has risen from 1.6 in September 2007 to 3.2
in September 2010, thus becoming closer to the churn rate of the Dutch TTF.5
Figure 3 Information efficiency (a)
4. Ninety-five% of natural gas trading volume at EEX is related to the market area of NCG, only 5%
to GASPOOL.
5. The number 1.6 is related to the market zone of E.ON as a precursor of NCG. Compared to the
British National Balancing Point (NBP), the most liquid hub in Europe, churn rates in Continen-
tal Europe are still significantly lower. NBP has a churn rate of around 10.
C. Growitsch et al.
© 2013 The Authors.
German Economic Review © 2013 Verein f€ur Socialpolitik14
For GPL-TTF and NCG-TTF, a major increase in the speed of information
processing can be observed during the fourth quarter of 2008, shortly after the
creation of NCG.
The zero value of a between GPL and NCG around January 2009, which indi-
cates that prices did not adjust to new information in any way, can be
explained by the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine. On 1 January 2009,
Russia stopped gas delivery to the Ukrainian transmission network completely.
Russia accused the Ukraine of consuming gas illegally, importing gas that had
been designated for transit to Germany and other European countries. Since the
EU imports approximately 25% of its gas from Russia, with the main transit
route via the Ukraine, the suspension of delivery resulted in gas shortages in
Central and Southeast Europe, which necessitated a rearrangement of gas flows.
While cross-border gas transport only changed the direction, the rearrangement
within Germany led to temporary inefficient pricing behaviour. Nevertheless,
after GRTgaz, ENI and GVS joined NCG in October 2009, the information pro-
cessing between GPL and NCG dropped to zero again. At the same time, infor-
mation efficiency between NCG and TTF increased considerably up to
approximately 100%. Both developments indicate the relative importance of
NCG over GPL.6
To summarise, although price convergence did not substantially increase since
the mandatory introduction of the entry–exit system, information efficiency
with regard to cross-border trades has increased significantly over the following
3.5 years. As Barrett and Li (2002) point out, market integration has to be distin-
guished from efficiency issues in spatial price analysis. Regarding the price rela-
tions between the two major German market zones for natural gas as well as the
connection to the Dutch TTF, markets are sufficiently integrated to provide for
an improved processing of new information. Prices between NCG and TTF adjust
within one trading day.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The aim of this article was to study the development of market integration and
efficiency in Germany after the mandatory introduction of an entry–exit network
pricing regime in the natural gas market. We applied Johansen’s cointegration
analysis and a time-varying coefficient approach (Kalman filter) to test for price
convergence. The state space model is extended to an error correction model to
analyse how fast prices are able to adjust to new information, i.e. how efficient
the markets are.
We explicitly account for transportation costs to test the spatial arbitrage con-
dition using price series for the two major German market areas, NCG and GPL,
as well as data from the Dutch TTF hub as a competitive benchmark. Results of
6. The drop back of a to zero for GPL and NCG during the second half of the observation period
can also be interpreted differently. Since the price statistics in Table 2 show few price differences
exceeding transportation cost differentials for these two market zones, the development of a
might be due to the fact that price arbitraging between the two German market zones is already
done intraday. This hypothesis goes against the straight forward interpretation of a as an indica-
tor for information efficiency. We thank an anonymous referee for this comment.
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the Johansen approach show a level of price convergence close to one between
all three locations, with the Dutch TTF – as the more mature market – leading
the pricing behaviour at both German hubs. The time-varying coefficient model
reveals lower levels of convergence, which are nonetheless sufficient to indicate
an improved processing of new information between the larger German hub
NCG and TTF. Since the mandatory introduction of the entry–exit system, infor-
mation efficiency has increased significantly, especially after the merger of the
two market zones resulting in the foundation of NCG in October 2008 and the
additional enlargement of the NCG consortium in October 2009. Prices adjust to
new information within one trading day.
Future research may extend the analysis to entire Europe. Moreover, it could
be interesting to analyse different regulatory regimes in terms of their effect on
the functioning of the respective wholesale markets. And a special focus should
be put on the importance of transport capacity.
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